

# NEED AND THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

William R. Brown

Professor Emeritus, The Ohio State University

60 West North Street

Worthington, Ohio, 43085

(614) 436-3692

drwilliamrbrown@yahoo.com

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Background: Update of a 1987 essay used in the Rhetoric of Social Intervention course at the Ohio State University. The essay describes the third subsystem of the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model, first introduced in *Ideology as Communication Process* (Brown, 1978). Subsystems one and two are detailed in *Attention and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention* (Brown, 1982) and *Power and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention* (Brown, 1986).

### Abstract

Fourth and final in a series of essays (see Brown, 1978, 1982, 1986) treating communication as driver of history, this piece argues for the symbolic constitution of need, showing also its systemic role in power relationships and in ideology with reference to American minority-majority communication. The essay (1) develops a communication-based rationale for “need” as an entry point for rhetorical intervention, with “need” viewed as being both subordinate and superordinate to “attention” and “power,” (2) historically illustrates “need” as a dynamic for rhetorical intervention into communication between whites and African Americans, and (3) demonstrates via a case study specifically the strategies, tactics, and maneuvers of “need”-based rhetorical intervention into majority-minority communication. The essay concludes with a review of the implications of need mediation for power and ideological interventions and suggests research directions to students, scholars and practitioners of cultural change. Overall, the essay highlights the subsystem of need, which interacts interdependently with the subsystems of attention (Brown, 1982) and power (Brown, 1986) to form the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model (Brown, 1978).

## NEED AND THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

Without regarding marketing messages as social interventions American consumers internalize commercially asserted needs and buy products ranging from Apple to Zantac. Marxist critics see those same advertisements as conservative social interventions by this country's "consciousness industry" in order to maintain support for capitalist institutions via displacement of basic class-consciousness needs by spurious wants or commodity fetishism (Ewen, 2001). Whether seen simply as meeting new needs in the American pursuit of happiness or as diversionary moves to forestall a class struggle, advertisements warrant the importance to social-intervention models of a general inventional topic of "need." That general topic of "need," rather than specific advertisements is the subject of this essay. "Need," alongside previously developed topoi of "attention shifting" and "power" (Brown, 1978, 1982, 1986), completes a systemic view of rhetoric as the driver of history.

This essay (1) develops a communication-based rationale for "need" as an entry point for rhetorical intervention, with "need" viewed as being both subordinate and superordinate to "attention" and "power," (2) historically illustrates "need" as a dynamic for rhetorical intervention into communication between whites and African Americans, and (3) concludes with a case study specifically illustrating the strategies, tactics, and maneuvers of "need"-based rhetorical intervention into majority-minority communication.

### "Need" Viewed Systemically

As system, the rhetoric of social intervention is holographically conceived, i.e., "every part of the whole contains or implies the whole" (Jones, 1982, p. 199). As next is seen, the system has three nexuses—attention, power, and need—each of which implies or

contains information on the other two.

Holographically, “need” is always part of the process, though subordinate, when persons or groups communicate through “attention shifting” or “power,” as follows. First, rhetorical interventions conceptualized as shifts of attention from one lifeworld-organizing gestalt to another subsume *both* need and power (1) insofar as applying a new paradigm enables community members to attribute new needs and qualities to themselves and to be more or less active in advocating them to others, (2) insofar as such patterning entails the relative opening or closing of attention toward members of an in-group and/or outgroup, and (3) to the extent that such a switched patterning of experience constitutes intergroup relationships as being either competitive or cooperative, or one *and* the other. Second, power-based interventions subsume *both* need and attention inasmuch as need is presumed in human interdependency as the locus of power and inasmuch as power subsumes worldviews as bases for choices. In a problematic world, the medium of power transmits reductions of complexity which enable individuals and groups to choose actions without having to treat them as reflected-upon enactments of credo or knowledge (Brown, 1982, 1986).

Next, and to the point of this paper, when “need” itself becomes the third nexus, “attention shifting” and “power” are now subordinate, though always part of the process. The social realization of “need” makes attention shifts concomitant with it as persons or groups attend to one need rather than to another, shifting their attention from needs related, primarily but not exclusively, to individual identity to those stressing collective identity, for example. Further, “need” makes “power” concomitant with it as persons' opening or closing attention to audiences for need advocacy affects competitive or cooperative interdependency.

Holistically, then, “need” is both subordinate and superordinate to “attention” and

“power” in a rhetoric not of social control but of social intervention, by which rhetors' actions affect the ongoing growth of the social system (rather than pulling the levers of the social machine, as in a rhetoric of control).

### *“Need” as Given*

In treating need as superordinate intentional topic, this essay is obliged to consider the nature and genesis of what persons are accustomed to name as “need.” Models of rhetorical intervention, to be general, must accommodate conceptions of need as being both biosocial given and symbolic creation. To model need intervention in terms of only one or the other would covertly affirm the laws in classical logic of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle. To depict the two ontogenies of need as being in conflict would covertly affirm the logic of contemporary dialectic. To treat them as *apparent* polarities in which “need” is manifest in human affairs affirms a “trialectic” logic, which treats all three logics as being complementary to each other.<sup>1</sup>

First, then, “need” as biosocial “given.” As such, some need-based symbol using is referential rather than constitutive in nature. So rhetoricians with strong leanings to cognate fields in the social sciences have at hand a ready and growing list of needs as givens, i.e., needs not constituted by human communication, although it may be assumed to have had a role in the nurture half of the nature-nurture pair. Concerning needs as biosocial givens, scholars can view them as prompting or goading persons to undertake their own needs-meeting interventions into social systems.

Some “need” thus referred to is, strategically, *individual* need. For example, classic individuality-stressing givens are “personality” needs, all of which potentially impel the

individual to interact with others in the effort to meet such needs. These drives and motives range from the craving to satisfy creaturely appetites to the urge to subordinate them. From Freud (1990)<sup>2</sup> with his biologically based pleasure principle, to Horney (1992)<sup>3</sup> with her time-honored argument for the need to actualize innate human potentialities, to Roszak (1975)<sup>4</sup> with his vision of self-transcendence, to Maslow (1998) with his hierarchy of needs combining all of these, such motivations are generally seen as *individual*-stressing givens.

On the other hand, other cognate scholars (Berger, 1964, 1970; Etzioni, 1968)<sup>5</sup> emphasize “given” needs such as social participation, political power, creative work, economic security, and collective transcendence. While also “given” motives, these are treated as *collectivity*-stressing needs for a person or for groups.

Still other trailblazing cognate scholars feature the interaction of personality and social needs, as does Simmel (1950),<sup>6</sup> with his postulate that human motivation follows from the creative tension between individual creativity and social conventions, and Sennett (1992),<sup>7</sup> with his related idea that growth is associated with conflict between the fulfilling self, on the one hand, and the social constraints of homogeneous communities, on the other.

The list could be multiplied, and future formulations will add to it, in possibly bewildering ways<sup>8</sup>; constant, however, is the assumption that human needs are givens, that they exist to be expressed, not constituted, in communication. When they are expressed, they become a social intervention. “Need” rhetoric in such cases consists of making appeals from or to these biosocial givens. Though expressed and shared through symbols, they—not the symbols—are the engines of change in human affairs. Rhetoric as the art of advocating “given” needs accords with Carey's (2008) definition of a medium that transmits instrumental messages.

*“Need” as Constituted*

By contrast to “needs” as givens, in considering “needs” constitutively, rhetoricians will take the well-known step alongside Burke (1969a, 1969b), Bormann (1972), and Scott (1967, 1976, 1994) of seeing motives and needs as arising in the very act of communicating. Rhetoric as the practice of *creating* taken-for-granted needs accords with Carey's (2008) definition of medium as culture. For these rhetoricians, the self- and other-*attribution* of need is an impetus for behavior, making rhetoric-as-epistemic henceforth the basis not only for knowledge but also of the very desires and needs to be known. The only “given” necessary to this stance is the Cassirer-Langer (1953, 1980)<sup>9</sup> new key for understanding human nature: the innate drive in that creature toward the symbolic transformation of experience.

This essay stresses, in sections two and three, the *constitution* of “need.” In other words, this essay stresses the genesis of need in symbol use, per se. The symbolic constitution of need proceeds from the human rage for representational order. Symbols, the tools of rhetoric, with their potency for making “present” the not-here and the not-now are the practical basis for such order, which is a *group* constitutive “need.”

Seeing that transformation of experience into symbols necessarily involves order-conferring abstraction, German sociologist Luhmann (1979)<sup>10</sup> reasons toward an urge to reduce complexity as the primal human need. Such an abstractive reduction of complexity is instanced, American George Kelly (1992)<sup>11</sup> believed, in building trustable constructs (including needs) to act upon. In this view, the reduction of complexity, the construction of trustable predictions on which to act, and even the experience of matter, space, time, and number is the projection of the symbol-mongering mind. “I reject the myth of reality as

external to the human mind, and I acknowledge consciousness as the source of the cosmos,” announces American physicist Roger Jones (1982). “It is mind that we see reflected in matter” (p. ix). Another subsuming way to view the starting point for human need is, then, persons' propensity to construe a connected world in a universe made problematic by the arbitrariness of symbol-making activity, itself (Brown, 1978).

Individual “need” is also constituted. This symbolic creation of need is crucially instanced in the case of any supposedly purely physical appetite. For example, Becker's (1953) study of fifty marijuana users argues that solitary assimilation of the drug is insufficient to create a “need” for the user; rather, such need appears only after symbolic *attribution* by “others” to a “self” (1) of symptoms that one is under the influence and (2) of pleasure in being aware of those symptoms. Out of the symbolic transformation of experience comes—in this version—the “physical” need to ingest marijuana. The need for that substance is made “real” by the social exchange of symbols.

How, theoretically, occurs this process by which “need” as *naming* is lost sight of in need as *reality*, itself to be taken for granted as a given, as a phenomenon? “Need” is symbolically constituted via code switching, taking the sensible for the sense-able. That it is an instance of “confusing” the “sensible” with the “sense-able” in human experience is shown next.

Reminiscent of Perelman's (1982, 1990, 1991) view of rhetoric's domain as the doctrine of confused ideas is the “code switching” doctrine of British anthropologist Edmund Leach (1976). “For analytical purposes it may be useful to distinguish. . . signal, sign, and symbol, but in practical cases there is always confusion. Signs are converted into symbols, symbols into signs, signs and symbols both masquerade as signals and so on” (p. 45). Out of this “confusion” comes the symbolic constitution of reality, in which agreed-upon ways to assign meaning



(naming) drop “out of sight” in culturally derived conventions as taken-for-granted “things” like “need.” The process of “forgetting” name-as-name is one of mixing metaphoric (the sensible) and metonymic (the sense-able) codes to produce the conviction that the non-sensed (metaphor) is the sensed (metonymy), i.e., “real.” “By code switching between symbols [with arbitrary connections between index and its interpretation] and signs [with intrinsic connections between the index and its interpretation] we are able to persuade one another that metaphoric non-sense is really metonymic sense” (Leach, 1976, p. 22). An idea kindred to Leach's is Burke's (1969b) own rhetoric of confused ideas by which the “material” is “spiritualized” and the “spiritual” is “materialized.” Leach, unlike Burke, however, does not attach odium to this code switching back and forth between “material” and “spiritual.” Rather, code switching makes symbols into sense by *non-pejorative* materializing of the spiritual and spiritualizing of the material. By conventionalized code switching, persons act out an holographic “representational process,” in which “inchoate ideas” such as “marriage,” “fatherhood,” and I add, “need”—all symbolic in nature—acquire “manifest physical” presence (sign) and internal biological trigger (signal).

The conversion via code switching is holographic and rhetorical in nature, arising both from discourse and icons, with each of these becoming metaphor for the other.<sup>12</sup> Speech acts and rhetorical actions are examples of code switching to constitute reality, including “need.” For example, the enactment of vows is “marriage” and a spark for biological bonding. The code switching goes the other way, too; biological bonding is “spiritualized” to make “real” a “commitment.” The birth certificate objectifies “fatherhood” and obligates that parent to nurturance as a biological function. In the instance of a certain social “need”—as will be described in more detail shortly—the opening of doors to public restaurants, hotels, and schools is by code switching the “need” for “equality” in American society—as signal, both goad and

goal for behavior. In a phrase, via code switching, we symbol mongers produce metaphor as reality and reality as metaphor. By such a representational process, “need” as naming is lost sight of in need as reality, as phenomenon, so that “need” is as taken-for-granted as is “attitude.”

In such manner, Leach provides leads toward a rhetoric for constituting “need.” By its operation, lists of human needs are of the same ontic status as the Elizabethan humors that dictated appetites and prompted action: The sanguine, the choleric, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. Once negotiated among name-seeking creatures, such constructions apparently take on a life of their own as long as the social attribution of facticity continues, as it currently does not in the instance of the humors.

Overall, the need to name one's experience, including one's “needs,” is necessary but not sufficient to the meeting of needs. Also required is the social exchange of names and naming strategies. This both/and approach to the linguistic genesis of need therefore holographically entails (1) invoking “power” as the code for human interdependency via negotiated needs, and (2) periodic emphasizing of either the anomalies or the coherence within a worldview version of needs met and unmet. Once derived as taken-for-granted, needs can be taken as enthymematic materials in the rhetoric of need intervention, in which the nature, the hierarchy, or the consequences of needs are urged—including the ideological identities entailed in persons as needers.

When needs of collectivities are salient in the rhetoric of social intervention, foregrounded is the shared identity among persons in the community; when needs of *individuals* are strong in rhetoric, highlighted is the possession of unique personal qualities. In neither emphasis—group or individual—is “need” exclusively that of the existent person or of the subsistent group, however. Further, by the linguistic genesis of need, the creation and satisfaction

of need proceed together, providing a starting point for intervening into power relationships and ideologies.

Such is the rationale for need-based rhetorical intervention. Prior to its modeling, it is important to see the genesis of an ongoing American need—with both individuality and group-stressing versions—as backdrop for interaction between whites and African Americans during most of the last century and to the present. The next section, then, (1) further exemplifies code switching, which generates the need for “equality” and (2) interprets majority-minority communication historically as the accompaniment of need salience, advocacy, and responsiveness.

#### Need Intervention as Historiographic Principle

In this culture, the Revolutionary War had, long before the racial crises of the twentieth century, legitimized the assertion in the Declaration that all persons were created equal and endowed with the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

First, code switching constituted an *individual* “need” for “equality.” The individuality-stressing version of this socially constructed need was the conception of the individual's dignity and worth. “Spiritually,” in *metaphor-as-reality*, it had been part of the American Dream “of being able to grow to fullest development as man and woman, unhampered by the barriers which had slowly been erected in older civilizations, unrepressed by social orders which had developed for the benefit of classes rather than for the simple human being of any and every class” (Adams, 1941, p. 176). “New” meant “natural,” “in and of nature,” real. In the individual-stressing need for equality, the cherishment of all “real” individuals meant the realization of equality *en masse*.

Second, code switching constituted a *group*-stressing need for “equality.” The version of

group-stressing equality, without ignoring the individual, code mixed the conception of natural rights with icons of their denial, making present for all revolutionaries their shared deprivation and group-stressing identity. After cataloguing the King's trespasses against “natural,” i.e., real, rights, the Declaration further personified, via reality as metaphor, the *denial* of equality for all Americans: “*Our* [emphasis added] repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.” This group-stressing equality need found its affirming reality-as-metaphor in the corps of minutemen who “fired the shot heard 'round the world,” the yeoman farmer multiplied manifold to become the embodiment of an army of revolutionaries. Whites and African Americans fought together as living paradox of equality and inequality. In this group-stressing need for equality, serving the *common* good best guaranteed the individual's need satisfaction.

Next, and relevant to equality and hierarchy, code switching turns sign into symbol. Singly and in groups, Americans since the Declaration and the Revolution have sought “materialized” equality in reality-as-metaphor, all too often the sign of skin pigmentation being used to render into sensation the non-sense of the *symbols* “equal” and non-equal.” Further, code mixing turns symbol into sign. For example, in legal definitions of white and black, the arithmetical calculation of genetic inheritance has itself—through code switching—been treated as *physical* perception of black or white pigmentation.

On such bases it has been possible to deny the personhood of African Americans. For what the Declaration conferred, the Constitution shortly had taken away from some Americans by constituting each slave as only three-fifths of a person for purposes of allocating membership in the House. The ambiguity of that minority status was not to be

resolved until the twentieth century, despite consistent African American advocacy of personhood from the beginnings of the nation (Golden & Rieke, 1971).

In the meantime, even when the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional an 1875 civil rights act and in *Plessy vs. Ferguson* had endorsed segregation and white supremacy in the so-called separate-but-equal decision, the talk in America of “equality” continued.

“Equality” as need was constituted by discourse, prescribing it as a fundamental descriptor of the human condition, which—when denied—became treated as signal, as biological goad to action. In conception, all persons are equal in their rights to liberty, to life, and to the pursuit of happiness.

In the very act of denying equality of racial minority with majority, the post-1876 settlement on national white supremacy and the consequent creation of the black codes known as Jim Crow laws contributed to the culturally taken-for-granted “realness” both of equality as a *human* requirement and the lack of full humanity for African Americans. As long as they acquiesced in the Jim Crow society, whether *de jure* in the South or *de facto* in the North, African Americans became reality-as-metaphor, rendering “real” a hierarchy based on skin color. Equally unwittingly, whites—on the other hand—ratified personhood of African Americans when, during World War I, some were admitted to skilled and semi-skilled jobs on the home front and were drafted, like whites, to bear arms in the war to make the world safe for democracy via self-determination of all nations.

With the genesis of African Americans' need for equality sketched, the time has come to model “need” as a dynamic in social interventions, to see jointly how “need” (1) salience, (2) advocacy, and (3) responsiveness comprise an historiographic principle in this instance for narrating bi-racial communication in more detail.


### *Need Intervention as Historiographic Strategy*

Needs (such as equality)—their advocacy and the relative attention or inattention of their advocates to audiences—anticipate the model of need intervention to be exemplified further in a moment by minority-majority communication. As prelude to narrating such cycles of need (or more accurately, spirals—since events/contexts change and do not by analogy occupy the same “space”), this section continues with a glance at those occurrences which define the boundaries of need interventions. The following model accommodates need as previously conceived both (1) as a phenomenal “given” to be expressed in communication, and (2) as a symbolic creation to arise in communication.

Although one can begin with any juncture in the need spiral, for convenience its initiation may be viewed as the event of persons experiencing or attributing a need which is relevant to their growth or survival. A logically prior requirement is that there be a socially shared name for the need. Second and concomitantly with need salience, there occurs individual and/or group advocacy for needs-meeting by relevant others in the communication system. Specifically, such advocacy can range from the catatonic's rigid silence to the charismatic's mass movement, from petition to agitation, from discursive to iconic message modes. Third, and concomitantly with experiencing and advocating needs is an opening or dampening of attention to others in the social system who conceivably have the ability to be responsive to the advocated need. This attention, whatever degree or form it takes, is the interface with “others”—individuals or groups—in the society. It includes being not only more or less attentive to needs-*meeting* responses from others but also being more or less open to the advocated needs of others to which it is possible to be responsive.

As will be seen later, in the third and final section of the essay, these three junctures prompt the invention of specific strategies, tactics, and maneuvers of need-based intervention. For the present, however, it is sufficient to see the junctures form the historiographic need spiral. Historically, a *dynamic* equilibrium in societal arrangements occurs in “deviance-compensating” spirals, as follows. The greater the intensity of *collectivity*-stressing needs which must be mediated by others, then the more advocacy there is for response to such group needs from mediating others, and the more openness by advocates to those relevant audiences; the spiral is completed when responses from those audiences are interpreted by advocates as having addressed the need, with a theoretical decrease of its intensity. Concomitant with its decreased salience is the increase of *individuality*-stressing needs, along with increased advocacy of them, and enhanced openness to a need-meeting audience, being either the same or different group or individual as before; all this associates over time with the increasing strength of a *revised* group-centered need, with more advocacy of it, and so on. Over time, the need system avoids vicious circles.

By contrast, without audience response seen by advocates as being needs-meeting—whether group- or individual-stressing—the system will theoretically run down as a need ideology. Even a partial or delayed needs-meeting response will tend to prevent occurrence of a system-breaking “vicious circle.”



With the background of the constitution of equality as a cultural need outlined and with a model of need dynamics sketched, it is time to map bi-racial communication onto the model, the better to see “need” as a communication-based dynamic. Seen to be working out across time will be “need” as a periodical and potentially deviance-*amplifying*, recurring “syndrome” of African American psychological withdrawal from contact with whites, as discerned by Clement (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 265): “The syndrome consists of three elements: great expectations, followed by dashed hopes, then despair and discussions of separatism.” Also seen are needs-meeting responses from the majority, responses which keep the need system, and the discourse, going.

### *An Historical Case Study of “Need” Interventions*

Prior to World War I, whites and African Americans had lived in a symbolic environment



dependent on the metaphor/reality of separate-but-equal, following the response of the majority to minority after the 1876 “settlement” of regional race relations.

The African American need cycle starts with making salient *individual* “need,” with *group* “need” subordinated in the advocacy of change agents. Specifically, as related to Figure One, African American advocacy of group-stressing equality had declined under Booker T. Washington's chained-out analogy between separatist social relations of the races and the fingers of the hand—along with his “materializing of spiritual” equality by urging that “the opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera house” (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 115). With a corresponding decrease of advocacy for blacks' collective equality, the majority could and did attend to other matters, even while—as Figure One suggests—intensity of the group-equality need grew for African Americans. For example, younger speakers such as W.E.B. DuBois had beaten their fists against the closed doors of civil rights and public accommodations. The metaphoric open door “is expressed today,” said DuBois (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, pp. 236-238) in 1910, “in the right of white men to go anywhere they choose and be treated with consideration and respect. It will be expressed tomorrow in the right of the colored races to return the visits.” Unlike Washington and his cohorts, DuBois and kindred thinkers tended to see the concreteness of *many* career and professional choices as the metaphor of black equality. Unlike the then-dominant BTW party with its stress on the economic need of individuals, the DuBois school focussed on a group-stressing need, treating African Americans not as a collection of individuals but as a class. “So long as the race prejudice in the South shows its result in...disenfranchisement of a large part of the working class...just so long race prejudice is bound to be a burning question of practical politics. Today the problem is becoming more and more economic.” Salience of a

comprehensive need for group-stressing equality was growing.

Then World War I, with its heretofore unparalleled emphasis on mobilization of resources and people for a national crisis, probably provided a widespread reality-as-metaphor supporting *group* versions of African American needs. At war's end, they probably expected a consolidation of scattered gains made during the conflict; whites probably expected a return to the post-1876 “settlement” of the race question. In terms of the need spiral, concomitant with increasing intensity of group-centered equality, its advocacy was about to increase if the white majority appeared to be unresponsive.

The clash of expectations became clear in the summer and autumn of 1919. Race riots and white repressions were set off by a variety of precipitating events, including the attempted black use of “white only” recreation areas, by the organization of their economic self-help organizations (considered subversive or revolutionary by white officialdom and news organs), and by assertions and allegations of African American criminality, including sexual offenses)(Waskow, 1966).

Emerging from the disorder of 1919 was a new instrumental need for African Americans which would adjust the dream of equality to common-sense experience: In a collectivity-stressing version of that need, African Americans would “fight back” in order to claim equality. With reference to Figure One, advocacy of group-emphasizing need would increase in the form of resistance, rather than acquiescence, to white supremacy. It meant that the circlings of the “need” dynamics were spiral and not cycle. Further, following the riots of 1919, the group-focused version of equality dominated black advocacy, just as earlier, while being present in discourse of those like DuBois, it had been less popular than the BTW-like individualized version.

In the promotion of his “New Africa,” then, Marcus Garvey was reminiscent of John H. Smyth's turn-of-the-century assertion that “*race* individuality” (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 308, emphasis added) had to be taken into account, although Garvey promoted a black initiative for black nationality while Smyth had favored separate-but-equal education for blacks. “Let the white race stop thinking that all black men are dogs and not to be considered human beings,” Garvey (in Golden & Rieke, 1971 pp. 378-379, 395-396) urged, near the height of his popularity in the early 1920s. In an enactment of Clement's potentially system-breaking syndrome, Garvey exhorted, “Let foolish Negro agitators and so-called reformers, encouraged by deceptive and unthinking white associates, stop preaching and advocating a doctrine of 'social equality,' meaning thereby the social intermingling of both races, intermarriages, and general social co-relationship.” Instead of being “industrial slaves,” “social slaves,” and “political slaves,” the minority race would “stop at nothing until there is a free and redeemed Africa!”

In the years following 1919, with a partially needs-meeting response from the majority, black advocacy of group-focussed needs continued, though Garvey's version of it waned. The Supreme Court's concession of due process following the racial clashes of 1919 became the venue for African American advocacy of group-stressing need (Brown, 1982, 1986).

For two generations following 1919, the dominant mode of African Americans' “fighting back” was legal class action—complicated, time-consuming, and often unnewsworthy in majority newspapers. During the 1920s that courtroom advocacy dwelt on protecting legal rights of minorities accused or convicted of crimes (Waskow, 1966). By the 1930s, the legal advocacy of African Americans as *class* had clearly moved to civil rights, in decisions involving equal education. The 1940s saw decisions ending “discriminatory practices in higher education” and deciding “segregation [to be] illegal in interstate commerce

(Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 242). On the eve in the 1950s of the *Brown* decision, Thurgood Marshall (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 246) epitomized group-need advocacy of equality by making the collective identity of African Americans the hinge issue in a case related to *Brown*. “The only way that this court can decide this case in opposition to our position, is that there must be some reason which gives the State the right to make a classification [in regard to African Americans] that they can make in regard to nothing else. . . , and we submit the only way to arrive at this decision is to find that for some reasons Negroes are inferior to all other human beings.”

In a needs-meeting response, a few months later came the Supreme Court's own reality-as-metaphor, making segregated classrooms the icon of inequality. “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” The climax to courtroom advocacy had arrived; as related to Figure One, intensity of the instrumental need for desegregated schooling would now decrease. African Americans were prepared to see the culmination of legal “fighting back” in the 1954 Supreme Court decision as the inevitable (and therefore minimal) response the majority would or could make. Whites, for whom much of the courtroom advocacy had been unattended to until 1954, were prepared to see the same decision as a major concession of equality. As needs-meeting response, the time-consuming implementation of that 1954 decision has been stretched out to the present moment, with *de facto* segregation sometimes occurring in quasi-public “private” schools. Today, numbers of depressed-area students drop out of functionally re-segregated schools to pursue an accessible “career” of drug-selling (Gates, 2004, pp. 341-342, 407-419); yet, middle-class African American high school students socialize apart from whites, failing to see that “middle” class no longer entails “white” identity.

At the time in question, however, courtroom advocacy of racial equality would

shortly appear to many to recede in a rising tide of street advocacy to be aimed at cultural expressions of equality additional to the hope of desegregated schools.

Public accommodations, voting rights, and job and housing openings—all personal “realities” as “metaphors” for equality—had been too long deferred and had grown in salience. With reference to Figure One, after a two-generational hiatus in major agitation on its behalf, the need system in bi-racial communication was growing toward increasing advocacy of individuality-stressing equality for each child of slavery.

In that version of need and advocacy, each was a child of God. That identity marked a return to equality conceived as the dignity and worth of the individual; among its advocates were leaders in American religious life. “Religion undertakes to meet this situation in the life of the dispossessed by seeking to establish for the individual a transcending basis of security,” preached Howard Thurman in 1959 (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, p. 92). “Stated in conventional religious terminology, it assures the individual that he is a child of God. . . . It assures him of a basic status that his environment cannot quite undermine,” he continued—as did others who like Thurman did not want simply to promise “pie in the sky by and by.” With a status not undermined by their environments, African Americans as children of God could join in that superordinate naming with whites as children of God to advocate together rather than as adversaries, as too often had been the case in the courtroom.

Rather than being undermined, they could sing that they would overcome. With individual need salience growing, that need advocacy increased, as prompted and coached by a Christian minister and others like him. Martin Luther King, Jr., found a transcending role for needers that began and ended with the individual worthy of equality. Numbers of those individuals, with King as role model, would advocate equality by enacting the persona of

Suffering Servant. Melding group-stressing needs with individuals' worth and dignity, King (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, pp. 250-256) noted “the emergence of a ‘New Negro,’ with a new sense of dignity and destiny,” who after the 1954 Court decision was “challenged to rise above the narrow confines of... individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of all humanity,” to the end that there would come “a world in which men will no longer take necessities from the masses to give luxuries to the classes; a world in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of all human personality.” At the heart of MLK's advocacy coaching was the conception of the Suffering Servant, who—in terms of Figure One—would open himself or herself to the majority culture, acting on the premise that whites had the capacity to respond to goodness (in Linkugel, Allen, & Johannesen, 1969).

As modeled in Figure One, black advocacy for this individual-stressing need for equality increased after 1954. For the sake of personal access to housing, jobs, the vote, and public accommodations, black protest—as in 1919—went back to the streets but stopped short of violence when the new needer's identity “Black and Glad” chained out as ethnic fantasy theme. Forms of advocacy were subsumed under the rubric of creative disorder (as sit-ins, freedom rides, marches, bus boycotts, job blockades, and selective buying campaigns).

When, however, needs-meeting responses from the majority apparently failed to reach inner cities, both the advocacy and the response failed to “appeal to one specific and extremely important [urban] group: adolescent youths and young men without jobs or education” (Waskow, 1966, p. 285). Instead of “Black and Glad,” they were “Black and Mad.” The decade-long non-violent advocacy of black dignity and worth was, to many African Americans and some whites alike, discredited and replaced by the fires in the cities in 1964 and later. Harlem, Rochester, Jersey City, Paterson, Philadelphia, Watts, Newark, Detroit, and as in 1919—Chicago and

Washington again. The target this time was not white civilians so much as it was the power of the state manifested in its police. With this circling of the spiral, a new meaning for African Americans in their struggle for equality developed. Not only would they “fight back”; they could also start a revolution.

In the years since the fires in the cities, collectivity-stressing “need” rhetorical interventions have continued, although as the need-cycle model predicts, its intensity has waned, following a needs-meeting intervention in 1965 and 1967 with LBJ's Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 establishing and expanding Affirmative Action to provide classwide remedies for unfavorable discrimination.

Variants of collectivity-stressing tactics include the continuing efforts of Black Muslims who advocate collective “equality—as a nation—of equals.” (in Golden & Rieke, 1971, pp. 406-410). An openly revolutionary collectivity was proffered by Kwame Toure, known at the time as Stokely Carmichael (in Golden & Rieke, p. 524) while quasi-exiled in Cuba. Blacks could not “take a problem...to the courts if those courts” were “all white”; further, “In a real sense, we have colonialism inside the United States. . . . We want to economically destroy capitalism because capitalism goes hand in hand with racism and exploitation.”

At the time and at present, a mainstream collectivity based on electoral politics has been offered in Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, stressing group needs of all minorities. To recite these initiatives in collectivity-stressing interventions is to remind oneself that the energy behind such a strategy may well be transforming into increased salience of individual-stressing needs.

Part of such a transition may be following from majority revisions of Affirmative Action. By 1986 cases involving that effort to address a collectivity-stressing need had gone to court. Was “Affirmative Action” to follow a group-stressing pattern (quotas) or an

individual-stressing pattern (personal qualifications). The trend has been away from quotas, as instanced in the first Bush's veto of what he called the “quota system” inherent in the Civil Rights Act of 1990. More recently, and more far-reaching than in states like California and Michigan which have voted to make Affirmative Action unconstitutional, are cases in the Supreme Court that limit the collectivity-stressing effect of Affirmative Action. In the *Grutter* and *Gratz* cases dealing with college admissions, the Supreme Court found for plaintiff *Gratz* on the grounds that certain undergraduate admission procedures had operated on a basis of quotas; the Court ruled in *Grutter* against the plaintiff because Michigan's law school was “narrowly tailored” to secure a “compelling state interest” in diversity, not simply to meet quotas. The upshot of these developments is to form a more favorable majority response to individual, rather than, group need advocacy.

Accordingly, at present as regards the need spiral, African American strategic advocacy of need is in a period of transition. During the first decade of the new millennium, African Americans are, on a scale perhaps greater than ever before, experiencing the “Black Divide”—one which goes beyond the obvious disparity between the lifestyles of a growing Black middle class and a persisting poor class: Associated with it is a contemplation of ongoing ways to advocate the need for equality. This divide was presaged in the schism between members of the first and those of the second migration to Chicago and points north during and after World War I (Gates, 2004, pp. 360-365). As African Americans move into the middle and upper classes, class trumps race, as was the case following the early migrations, as noted by a major African American scholar (Gates, 2004, p. 338).

As the consensus weakens on equality building through collectivity-stressing interventions, a historic strategy of individual-stressing communication comes in the form of the



Horatio Alger success dream enacted by those role-modeling “Ebony Towers” (Gates, 2004, pp. 1-17), those African American icons of the individual's American Dream of Work and Win. Promoting this strategy of individual-stressing “need” advocacy are real individuals who by code switching become metaphors for the rewards of individual striving (against, of course, a back-drop of group progress). These figures are drawn from the “consciousness industries” of politics—from local officials, to cabinet members, to the White House itself—and of entertainment, including Hollywood, the dream capital of the world (Gates, 2004, pp. 18-63, 81-103, 151-78, 199-206, 231-252, 262-334; Hewes & Chinn, 2004). On the other hand, collectivity-stressing “need” advocacy emanates from those who promote pan-minority or “concerted” public effort, ranging from expansion of “No Child Left Behind” to the payment of restitution (Gates, 2004, pp. 335-348; Hewes & Chinn, 2004).

A new individuality-stressing advocacy is likely to be developed in relation to ghetto youth as is indicated in efforts like those of Maurice Ashley, Lenora Fulani, and others whose approaches help point young people toward individual success and overcoming the limitations of self-stereotyping. Communication-based interventions like these, together with “need”-based maneuvers such as “Student Efficacy Training” in some Massachusetts schools, offer disadvantaged African American students the naming of an *individual*-stressing “identity affirming experience” (Tatum, 2003, pp. 71-74). Significantly, the meeting of individual needs rests on their gaining a better knowledge of African American accomplishments *en masse*. Further, such initiatives as these are, in the large picture, still “pilot studies” awaiting widespread duplication in American communities.

So at this writing, African Americans are still weighing various alternatives for advocating “need” via individual or group strategy. At present, with national attention con-

centrated on foreign policy and fiscal problems, intensity of equality needs is growing. In current circumstances of reviving high expectations for the quality of American life, the nation's currently largest minority will be heard from again in its advocacy of equality.

In summary, it is seen that bi-racial communication in the last century and the first decade of the present has been marked by a rhythm of alternating emphases in African Americans' championing of (1) individual-stressing with (2) group-stressing needs for equality. The advocacy itself has manifested a wide variety of settings, discourse, and events—all intended literally to make real for everyone concerned the need on the part of minority Americans for equality in a continuing constitution, via code switching, of that human need. Minority interpretations of majority responses have ranged from seeing those adjustments as being needs-meeting, to defining them as temporizing, to construing them as white repression. In the latter cases, African American advocacy has often embraced separatism, at times counseling revolution as enactment of Clement's “syndrome” of “great expectations, followed by dashed hopes, then despair and discussions of separatism.”

While this macro-version of black-white interaction allows one to see the importance of rhetorical intervention of symbolically constructed “need,” it does not feature the formal means of promoting change. Accordingly, after this scanning of black-white communication premised on need as a symbolic social dynamic, following are the rhetorical strategies, tactics, and maneuvers of need-based intervention, as exemplified in a close-up view of one local-level case study which itself offers a group-stressing version of need.

### Rhetorical Topoi for Intervention: A Case Study

The case study at hand, via action research in a Midwestern test-market city, illustrates *constitutive* rhetorical invention. It brought together communication scholars and spokespersons for an ethnic neighborhood in an effort at “community development,” defined as “social cohesion” (Pilotta, Murphy, Jones, & Wilson, 1982, p. 2). The project, together with its report, was named an assessment of neighborhood *needs* in relation to law and the legal system. That legal system was a “human delivery system which consists of all social communication that is formulated in reference to the law” (p. 2), operationalized as aspects of the courts, the police, and the community mental health services. Overall, in its insistence that its version of “community” was “a network of relationships” rather than an “abstraction” or “thing” (p. 32) the project demonstrated the sense-able reality of persons and events as the sensible metaphor of community. In so doing, the researchers as rhetoricians of intervention helped call into being a community of intervenors and make real its growth and survival requirements, as will appear in their invoking of the strategy, tactics, and maneuvers of “need.”

As already developed, only two topics for inventing *strategies* are involved in “need” as an entry point for social change: individual-centered needmaking and group-stressing needmaking. Rooted in the apparent polarity that one cannot envision either the individual or the group without reference to the other, the strategies are holographic in that they are each contained within the other. The practice of either one, then, includes both bases of identity—as indicated in such an expression as Smythe's turn-of-the-nineteenth-century “race individuality,” which recognizes but subordinates the existent individual in order to make significant the subsistent group.

Next, the following tactical rhetorical topics are, by analogy, “middle managers” in the

service of either strategic version of need: (1) Intervenors may affirm/deny needs, either by needers' own self-attribution, or that of others. For example, overall in this local case of building a taken-for-granted meaning for African American community, affirmed is the need of *collective* safeguarding against crime; denied is the need of a “personal” approach to protection (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 32). It will be seen in a moment that the overall tactic was needers' self-attribution of this group-centered growth-and-survival need. (2) Concomitantly, intervenors may prompt some means of advocacy and at the same time discourage others. Overall, as this section develops, the reader will see in the Driving Park Project that the practice of advocacy was part and parcel with need creation, for group-stressing needs required *collective* advocacy through a city-recognized neighborhood association, the Driving Park Commission (p. 44). Individual appeals or group demonstrations in the streets were not promoted. (3) Intervenors may facilitate/impede attention by needers to potential need meeters. Overall, in what follows will appear the conclusion that the community should attend to, and get the attention of the local bureaucracy of service delivery; the bureaucrats—on the other hand—were “*not* [to] treat the community in a bureaucratic manner”; rather, officials were to remember that being addressed was a “community,” not another bureaucracy (p. 38). Such an openness between needers and providers was also a criterion for evaluating efforts to meet needs.

Further, the tactic of opening channels among local groups was also an impeding of openness between needers and providers at state, federal, or private levels. (As a model project, of course, the study implicitly also (1) advocates the need on the part of *researchers* to carry out “action” research and (2) theoretically opens channels to other communities and providers at various levels for additional community-development projects. In what follows, however, treatment of tactical intervention will concentrate on the neighborhood-bureaucracy interaction.)

It will be understood that any maneuver can simultaneously actualize tactical topoi of (1) attributing/ denying needs, (2) prompting/discouraging advocacy, and (3) facilitating/impeding mutual openness between needers and providers.

Finally, at the lowest level of abstraction in the rhetoric of need intervention are topics for maneuvers, which at this level of abstraction both *constitute* and *regulate* the rhetorical scene of the intervention. Their catalog is long and will grow with the improvisations and the inventions of scholars. Clearly, the familiar doctrines of rhetorical practice apply here, as well as constructs in interpersonal, small group, organizational, and mass communication. In the instance of the Driving Park Action Research Project, it will be helpful to discuss maneuvers in two ways. In one emphasis, they inhere in the specific procedures of the project, which created events that altered the socially shared scene; in this recital of maneuvers, attention will fall first on their constitutive aspect. In the other emphasis, maneuvers inhere in the project recommendations and inferences leading up to them; in this latter recital of maneuvers, attention will fall on their doctrinal or regulative aspect. This twofold grouping of maneuvers is more a compositional convenience, however, than generic division: The praxis of events is also a proclaiming, and the saying of meaning is also a doing.

### *Recounting Constitutive Rhetoric in Need Intervention*

First, then, appear *constitutive* maneuvers in the rhetoric of need. As action research, the rhetoric of social intervention was not limited to the discourse in publication of findings and recommendations. Rather, as consultants, the intervenors helped create events which brought into being the very community being researched, advocated its needs, and facilitated interaction between needers and providers. Operationalization of need served the strategy of promoting

*group*-identity needs by embodying the tactics of (1) making needs salient and (2) prompting advocacy.

Researchers carried out a clearly constitutive maneuver, calling the community into being. That is, research procedures, themselves, constituted the community being researched, mixing science and politics. Doing the science was also making real the community. The scheduling and completion of “needs-assessing” interviews with “key” citizens, for example, made visible and documentable the community, not as “thing” or “abstraction” but as real persons who, via code switching from the “material” to the “spiritual,” stand as metaphor of social solidarity. The event creating the visible and documentable community was, of course, a form of network analysis, which “scientifically” assured the representativeness of “key citizens” and politically not only constituted them as voice of the community but also made visible the lines of “influence” that accounted for their “network of relationships” as the guiding metaphor of community (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 4). As firsthand event in the *neighborhood*, the network analysis allowed the community to emerge not from the abstractions of social science specialists but at its own call, its own self-attribution. Further, as “fossil” event later recounted in the project report, the account of the network analysis became a spin-off maneuver serving the additional tactic of opening mutual openness between providers and needers. To both, it helped testify to the “validity,” “reliability,” and “generalizability” of the findings.

In the second place, not only was the very being of the community self-attributed but also its group-stressing needs were constituted by another created event, the interviews themselves—both initial and follow-up. Teams of two interviewers became the “reflecting consciousness” for the need-attributing “self” of the person being interviewed. Scientifically, the interviewers' use of an open-ended interview format (with provisions for “validity” and

“reliability” of data constituted “observations” *as* observations (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 4).

Politically, the presence of one interviewer for questioning and of another for clarifying or “sounding board” feedback as guarantee of accuracy brought into being the official doctrine of the community.

Researchers invented a second-level constitutive maneuver: prompting advocacy of *group* needs. As firsthand events in the neighborhood, the interviews, as reflected appraisals, (1) made real the group needs and also enhanced their intensity and (2) encouraged and rehearsed their advocacy. As second-hand events recounted in the Driving Park report, the interviews potentially legitimized the published doctrine of need not only for residents-become-community but also for providers, simultaneously exemplifying the topoi of (1) warranting the *group*-centered needs, (2) embodying *collective* need advocacy, and (3) opening to providers' understanding the experienced world of community needs.

Next, researchers-as-intervenors carried out a third constitutive maneuver: directing attention to needs-meeting “others.” Additional “scientific” rhetorical maneuvers also constituted openness of attention between needers and providers. As just seen, the events of network analysis and key-citizen interviews served primarily the two tactics of increasing need intensity and prompting advocacy of those needs. Further, another scientific/political event primarily served mutual openness between providers and needers. As the key-citizen network became visible, so did—as spin off—the identification of “key mental health and social service personnel” (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 4). With these real persons standing as metaphor of the legal system at large, it was feasible to interview them and to obtain their perceptions of Driving Park residents, to the end that contrasts could later be made between official perceptions and the duly constituted needs of the emerging community. “Scientifically,” a process of

“triangulation” was carried out within both sets of interviews “to understand how the Driving Park community understands itself in terms of the legal system as well as how the legal system understands itself in terms of the Driving Park community” (p. 5). Politically, the “triangulation” of all interview data served to put the Driving Park Commission—through its access to the interpreted data—at the center of possible interactions between the community and service agencies. As firsthand event, the interviews cast researchers as DPC proxies to open up channels for dialogue; the “triangulation” itself of data was, however, out of sight to most persons and hence added—via its quasi-priestly social science role—to the legitimization of DPC as intermediary for citizens and public servants. As reported or “fossil” event, for an indefinite time after the ostensible conclusion of the project, the account in the project report became transcript to invoke as precedent for ongoing dialogue between “community” and the “legal system.”

Finally, as the creation of events to foster tactically the necessary openness between needers and providers, researchers sought and publicized endorsements of the study, both prior to and during the research. They did so not only to garner resources for its completion but also to create open channels between the Driving Park community and public services related to the legal system. Many endorsements made privately to assure access to interested parties are not part of the project's written record. But indicating the importance of endorsing events is the list, at the opening of the report, of persons submitting “letters of support” for the project (Pilotta et al, 1982, pp. iii-iv). In interpersonal recounting of these “blessing” events, as well as their appearing in the project report, intended was the construction of a need among providers to be responsive to neighborhood exigencies. Significantly, all the endorsers served the neighborhood in the study as part of some larger constituency. Politicians included a United States Senator, two



members of Congress, a state senator, and a city attorney. Other public servants were the metropolitan police chief, the director of government affairs, and the director of a local program for the study of crime and delinquency. Citizen advocate groups were represented by the state-level Public Interest Campaign, the regional office of the NAACP, and others. Further, a group of academically related individuals and organizations helped to provide an intellectual “birth certificate” for the project. As the bandwagon of endorsements rolled, doors not only opened for data gathering, but theoretically ears also opened between the “legal system” and the Driving Park “community.”

In summary, researcher-created rhetorical events helped (1) to constitute self-attributed needs, (2) coach their means of advocacy, and (3) encourage relevant attention from the target “community.” Overall, these tactics and maneuvers helped to actualize the community and its cohesiveness; at the same time, no small part of such social solidarity was the community “self-determination” growing out of *regulative* doctrine contained in findings and recommendations of the study. To those, the discussion turns next.

### *Recounting Regulative Rhetorical Intervention*

In a holographic sense, the constitutive maneuvers just summarized were part and parcel with the regulative ones to be considered next. For in actualizing tactics of need intensity, advocacy, and attentiveness, most of the project talk and written report did not argue for needs so much as simply to assert them. After all, the science/politics of procedures had conferred ontic status upon the community as network of relationships and its growth-and-survival needs. The remaining task in the report and in project talk was simply to announce those needs as community doctrine, which would set the “rules” for interaction between

“community” and the “legal system.” Further, however, such announcements implied the rhetoric of narrative argument (Knoll, 1932; Brandt, 1970; Fisher, 1984)<sup>13</sup> with its creation of presumption by a controlling point of view. Throughout the Driving Park Project, the needs and networks of *providers* are largely ignored. With Perelmanian presence conferred upon needs and networks of needers, the presumption is that *those* needs have priority and must be negotiated through the network making concrete the abstract community. In large part, then, the maneuvers legitimizing a new orthodoxy of needs and need-meeting exemplify “art that conceals the art.” It will be seen, however, that when the Driving Park Report moves to its denouement, that minor forms of rhetorical maneuvers are clearly invoked.

What, then, at the first tactical juncture for “need” became the regulative doctrine for attributing specific equality needs to Driving Park residents? The received view was the need for collective solutions. Overall, “from the citizens' perspective, *crime prevention refers to a collective or social action that allows each individual to lead an unencumbered life (not barricaded in his/her home) while simultaneously reducing the neighborhood's vulnerability to crime*” (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 3). The received view of community need—after the Driving Park Project—centered on the requirement of reducing *community* stress, for the sake of equality before the law. “If the legal system is viewed as neither responsive nor relevant to the community's needs, sentiments and sense of justice, social stress develops in a community” (pp. 6-10) Such social stress is announced by finding that in regard to a supposed community mental health program, the Driving Park Community had no input to planning, no members on boards of directors, no easy access to services for family stability, for the elderly, for substance-abuse programs, and for employment assistance (pp. 10-14). The unresponsiveness heretofore of providers to needers was heightened in the Report's summary of mental health professionals'

perceptions vis-a-vis the community. Federal budget cuts were destroying support programs like staff training for community outreach; delivery of service still depended on outmoded and abstractly conceived assessments of community needs; professional staff make-up was not reflective of community make-up; and while the agency's service style had, in the words of a professional, not been “discriminatory” it had also not been “affirmative” (p. 16).

Further intensification of social stress in the community arose from community-police relations. An unmistakable sign of the stress was a generalized sense, in the beginning, of community “powerlessness in the face of crime,” particularly amidst the “ambiguity” arising from an official “public affairs announcement and the crime prevention unit's directive that the police cannot *stop* crime, only the community can” (Pilotta et al, 1982, pp. 16-19).

Powerlessness was aggravated by disparities in the nature of perceived crime between citizens and police. To adults in the Driving Park, vandalism, loitering, littering, heavy vehicular traffic, and poor sewage and garbage service were reality-as-metaphor, materializing the abstraction of social disorganization, breeding crime and creating fear accompanied by little neighborhood self-surveillance because of that fear. However, in contrast to crime being property-related, to Driving Park youth, violence by adults, selling of drugs and “hot goods,” and threats to personal safety all added up to social fear of crime against persons (pp. 21-22). In the perceptions of police, however, there were fewer juvenile problems in the Driving Park area than in other areas, a lower level of drug-related problems, and a lower level of domestic violence; to them, fear of crime was an *individual*—not a social—matter (p. 28).

Providers surveyed generated an alternative reality. The police took the role of a needs-meeting intervenor, regarding salience of individual “need.” In the midst of the action research as social intervention, the law-enforcement needs meeters initiated a block-watch program to

reduce crime via citizen involvement. The block-watch interaction of police and community became a test case for the regulative rule that neighborhood needs had to be treated by all parties as *group* needs, not—as the police saw it—as individual needs.

Researchers incorporated the block watch in their own needs assessment by using “cross checking” of multiple observers' notes on block-watch implementation to the “general” Driving Park attitude that the “block watch . . . was a *very good program* and the relationship between the police-community had been enhanced” (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 27). Later, however, the block watch was interpreted as not being needs-meeting. “After the training sessions had been completed, citizens expressed *dissatisfaction* with the program and felt confused because they lacked direction from the police” (pp. 33-34). Implementation efforts had been marked by incongruent expectations between police and citizens. Non-constitutive discourse was related to failure of the alternative intervention. To police, crime prevention was apparently closely related to *individual* security—as signified by recommending installation of better locks on doors and the like. From the “community” perspective, as regulated by emergent needs doctrine, crime prevention was closely involved with *collective* and pre-emptive action.

Experience with the block-watch program rendered still more intense, then, the area's *group*-stressing need for equality before the law. The block-watch program had done so by seeming to be unresponsive to the community. There had been no community input into planning the start-up, no use of interpersonal networks in defining boundaries of each smaller part of the neighborhood, little encouragement of participation by citizens at training sessions, no cultural sensitivity to African Americans' lifeworld (Pilotta et al, 1982, pp. 27-32).

A regulative doctrine of group-stressing needs had emerged from community self-attribution. It was, in brief, a version of “Let's build a town,” the community initiative re-

enacted countless times, as McLuhan once urged, in the filmic world of the Old West movies. More of the potential contribution to community ideology by this regulative theme will appear in a moment. For now it is enough to see that as criterion for inventing and communicating interventions, the self-attributed need to reduce social stress by community self-determination is a regulative doctrine. As *the* salient growth and survival need, it becomes orthodoxy.

Concomitantly with regulative rules of *naming* need were those for *advocating* need, the second tactical topic for inventing maneuvers in the service of need-based tactics.

Overall, the practice of community-based planning emerges in the Project report as the most suitable means of championing community needs. The Driving Park community is to “assert itself” (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 44) in “concrete social action” (p. 1) in order to foster social cohesion through the legal system. In mental health, the community will meet the service agency halfway in carrying out a variety of “community-sensitive needs assessments”; in producing public forums for interchange of views; in placing Driving Park Commission members on mental health boards of directors; in achieving wide circulation of mental health planning proposals so that leaders of the community will be “more intimately involved in formulation of plans of action” (p. 14). As to crime and justice, the Driving Park community will initiate community clean-up and maintenance, seeking merchants' help in maintaining an orderly environment—all as means of putting on notice the obligation of the city for adequate trash and sewage services (“poor response will be in violation of the Driving Park program” (p. 19)), create a youth board and a youth mediation board to identify persons harassing youth and to “deal with disputes between youth and parents without fear of recrimination” (p. 20); set up a youth employment service.

These “concrete” actions will dramatically advocate community-based planning

by carrying out stress-reducing actions. “The citizens interviewed in the Driving Park have accepted the responsibility” of stopping crime, “specifically, the citizens see the Driving Park Commission as having primary responsibility for providing direction” (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 16). In a moment this promotion of needs by direct action will be seen as a potential power intervention (Brown, 1986). Sufficient for the moment is its translation into maneuvers for rhetorically actualizing the third “need” tactic, the topic of opening communication channels between needers and providers.

Regulatively, then, the third tactical juncture for need intervention is the facilitating of attention between the Driving Park and its service agencies. A number of additional linkages are recommended in the report. For mental health, additional linkages will include attendance by professional personnel at Driving Park Commission meetings; procedures will be streamlined to allow citizens to address directly the administration and board of the mental health establishment (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 14). As to crime and criminal justice, there will be an outreach program at the Night Prosecutor's office, so that Driving Park can access this agency designed to keep the poor and minorities from “*falling into the cracks of the system*” (p. 25).

Also there will be liaison between Community Commission and police on youth problems. There will be better interagency links among mental health, the police, and the Night Prosecutor; cultural sensitivity training for mental health and police personnel; training of police in *community* rather than in *public* relations; and provision for community input into police planning (pp. 23-26). Similar linkages are needed for development of the block watch (pp. 34-40). The enhancement of mutual attention between community and police will mean realization of the promulgated rule that “Citizens want someone who respects and protects them, not someone who suspects them” (p. 21). Such is the regulative doctrine setting the code, as rules, for openness

between needers and providers.

In summary, the Driving Park Project and report maneuvered constitutively and regulatively to make present and to promulgate strategically a *collectivity*-stressing need for equality in the eyes of the law. As action research, the project was intended “to evaluate the perceived sources of social stress in the Driving Park Community which is attributed to the 'legal system' and subsequently to develop a working model aimed at enhancing communication between the citizens and the representatives of the legal system” (p. 2). Shared with key persons in both the community and in the service agencies, the report was an invitation to reverse the “legal system's” trend toward unresponsiveness to the community.

In the denouement of the report, the stakes were high. Unless the “divorce” of the legal system and “auxiliary support systems” from the community was remedied, a continuing delegitimization of law would occur—with eventual system breakdown. Discursive rhetorical maneuvers supporting the claim were two: depiction of vicious [deviance amplifying] circles and invocation of “non-rhetorical” rhetoric. A vicious circle inhered among a lack of citizen involvement, fear of crime, and production of crime. “When delivery systems do *not* competently address and fulfill the relevant needs of the community, they must share in the responsibility for producing fear and crime in a community which, in turn, contributes to social disorganization” (Lewis and Salem, in Pilotta et al, 1982, pp. 43-44). The report's “anti-rhetorical” rhetoric both (1) that “organizational appeals initiated by the police, the community and mental health agencies cannot be made merely by invoking a rhetoric of common issues that are supposed to be important to everyone” and (2) that “it must now be realized that organizational efforts succeed only when they pertain to real needs of a community. . . (p. 46). In an apparently non-ideological approach purportedly free from abstraction and reification,

the research process had, by attribution of needs and relationships, provided persons as metaphors of both community and bureaucracy and thereby had constructed a reality to be ratified by other social actors.

What are the implications of all this for an holographic view of rhetoric as social intervention? With the Driving Park Project as a case in point, the essay concludes with the implications of “need” mediation for power and ideological interventions.

### Conclusion

“Needs” interventions are systemic. It will be recalled that a holographic metaphor for rhetorical invention will highlight the ways in which, within the model, every part contains the whole. In the instance of need-based intervention, then, the scholar and practitioner are committed to being alert to its aspect as power and attention shifting.

“Need” interventions affect power systems. On the principle that far-reaching changes often begin unobtrusively, nothing less may be involved than intervening into the evolution of a power code (Luhmann, 1979) itself, defined as “a rule-based code of behavior for making action or policy decisions without deliberating in the classical sense” (Brown, 1986, p. 181). Code, then, both as generalized agreement on meanings and as binding norms for behavior, forms a scenario of expectations (Luhmann). In the case of the power code, those expectations are relational in nature: cooperative, competitive, or mixed among the parties to policy choice, based on communication-created motives of threat, exchange, and integrity (Boulding, 1978; Brown, 1986). In the Driving Park Project, power mediation was not only *manifest* in the effort to heighten, via the needs assessment, the sensing of interdependency between the community and its municipal service agencies but also in the effort to make the Driving Park Commission the



broker between community and city. *Incipient* was the far-reaching possibility that the power-code scenario for race relations in this culture (Brown, 1986; Waskow, 1966) could posit different relationships between the majority and America's currently largest minority—namely the latter's move from disorder-creating power share (Brown, 1986) to one that would include for the *community* some of the present “state” power to exercise sanctions against disorder. That quiet possibility is the real import of the Driving Park report: “The citizens interviewed in the Driving Park have accepted the responsibility of performing the task [of preventing crime],” concluding in the denouement of the report that Driving Park needs a community justice center (Pilotta et al, 1982, p. 45). Like the massive continental drift dependent on the few centimeters of movement each year in ocean trenches, far-reaching adjustments in power codes may begin with the growing intensity of “needs,” their advocacy, and concentration of attention between needers and providers. Students of cultural change may wish to ask how power codes change over time by relating them to need-based intervention.

Finally, “need” interventions affect ideology. What import for attention shifting resides in understanding need interventions? One needs but to recall Kenneth Burke's (1969a) dictum that changes in scene bring about new actions because the latter now have congruency with the new scene to recommend them. For their adoption, attention switches probably depend as much on ideologies implicit in need-based rhetoric as on the articulated arguments of ideologues. In the Driving Park Project, it is not difficult to see the reality of key citizens and the Driving Park Commission meetings standing as metaphor for community, organized under the theme of “Let's Build a Town.” Such an organic growth of an organizing gestalt for everyday experience lends itself, in turn, to readiness for accepting ideologies at higher levels of abstraction. “Let's Build a Town,” for example, potentially readies its communicants for

either a Jeffersonian interpretation of urban life as participatory democracy or a Marxian interpretation of the urban minority community as liberated enclave. In this sense, then, need-based interventions may be viewed profitably as the creation of open and timely niches for the growth and development of lifestyle-organizing ideologies. In their very claim to be free of ideology and abstractions, some need-based interventions incipiently proclaim ideologies. Students of communication, political science, history, and political economy may wish to begin their studies of *Weltanschauung* with need-based rhetoric.

In fine, “need” interventions carry with them the imprint of “power” and “attention shifting”; need is always implicit in power and attention shifting. When contemplating or catalyzing the rhetorical constitution of need, power, and attention, the critic and change agent alike can join Blake in seeing the world in a grain of sand, holding infinity in the palm of the hand, and knowing eternity in an hour.

Such is the view of communication process provided by the hologram, a reality-as-metaphor of human communication.

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<sup>1</sup> The dialogue among some critical students of communication and communication students of Critical Studies may be characterized by saying it is the engagement between adherents to classical “idealistic” logic and those of contemporary “materialistic” dialectics. “Trialectics” is the term coined by Oscar Ichazo and popularized by Horn (1983). Not a “synthesis” of the first two, trialectics exemplifies what Black (1965) advocates as *argumentative* synthesis, which is an “engulfment. . . of controversy” (p. 155). Viewed not as a charter for a world crusade but as an intellectual genre cutting Gordian knots in both of the first two, trialectics could become cultural preoccupation in communication in the twenty-first century, notwithstanding objections by

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academics to its founder's mysticism or to the genre's being less than fully organismic (Bahm, 1984).

<sup>2</sup> “In the theory of psycho-analysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle. . . . [T]he course of those events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension—that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure” (Freud, 1990, p. 3). Freud went “beyond” the pleasure principle only by adding the death wish and unconscious repetition of behavioral patterns.

<sup>3</sup> “My own belief is that man has the capacity as well as the desire to develop his potentialities and become a decent human being, and that these deteriorate if his relationships to others and hence to himself is, and continues to be, disturbed. I believe that man can change and go on changing as long as he lives” (Horney, 1992, p. 19).

<sup>4</sup> “In what sense is the sanity I speak of higher? In that it builds its model of normality on the visionary awareness whose origins I have attributed to be Few, encouraging us to see our human identity as a rich potentiality that can be completely unfolded by an etherealization of life. . . . We approach a goal transcending time and matter—a goal that, once perceived, enlivens in us that subtle energy of personality which our ancestors called 'spirit'” (Roszak, 1975, p. 183).

<sup>5</sup> “To be human and to work appear as inextricably intertwined motives” (Berger, 1964, p. 311). Needs of “affection,” “recognition,” “context,” “repeated gratification,” all arise in relation to social participation. “Ultimately, there is no way for a societal structure to discover the members' needs and adapt to them without the participation of the members in shaping and reshaping the structure (Etzioni, 1968, pp. 625-626).

<sup>6</sup> “This conflict between the whole, which imposes the one-sidedness of partial functions upon its

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elements, and the part, which itself strives to be a whole, is insoluble” (Simmel, 1951, p. 59).

<sup>7</sup> “[I]f the multiple points of social contact once characterizing the city can be reawakened under terms appropriate to affluence, then some channels for experiencing diversity and disorder will again be open to men. The great promise of city life is a new kind of confusion possible within its borders, an anarchy that will not destroy men, but make them richer and more mature” (Sennett, 1992, p. 108).

<sup>8</sup> Hampden-Turner (1982, pp. 10-11) posits “given” needs in theories of mind such as emancipation from determinism, control of the subconscious, creativity, sociability, and dependence on anatomical necessity.

<sup>9</sup> “For the function of language is not merely to *repeat* definitions and distinctions which are already present in the mind, but to formulate them and make them intelligible as such” (Cassirer, 1953, p. 107). “The fact that the human brain is constantly carrying on a process of symbolic transformation of the experiential data that come to it causes it be a veritable fountain of more or less spontaneous ideas. As all registered experience tends to terminate in action, it is only natural that a typical human function should require a typically human form of overt activity; and that is just what we find in *the sheer expression of ideas*” (Langer, 1980, p. 43).

<sup>10</sup> “Luhmann,” says Poggi (1979, x-xii) “continually extols the evolutionary superiority of abstractness over concreteness.... He finds a great deal to applaud in the master trend of societal evolution, triumphant in modernity: The reduction of complexity through the formation of ever more numerous, differentiated and sophisticated systems....” Luhmann's discussions of truth, law, and power codes are cases in point of complexity reduction via symbolic abstraction.

<sup>11</sup> “Now what would happen if we were to reopen the question of human motivation and use our long-range view of man to infer just what it is that sets the course of his endeavor? Would we see

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his centuried progress in terms of appetites, tissue needs, or sex impulses? Or might he, in this perspective, show a massive drift of quite a different sort? Might not the individual man, each in his own personal way, assume more the stature of a scientist, ever seeking to predict and control the course of events with which he is involved?" (Kelly, 1992, pp. 4-5).

<sup>12</sup> Granted that Leach develops his claims with regard to "customs, other than verbal customs," his interest in customs as "text" which "can be said to 'mean'" together with his repeated use of discourse itself as being customary justifies extension of his view from iconic to discursive rhetoric.

<sup>13</sup> "We learn these truths by dwelling in the characters in the story, by observing the outcomes of the several conflicts that arise throughout it, by seeing the unity of characters and their actions, and by comparing the truth to the truths we know to be true from our own lives. (Fisher, 1984, p. 17). Knoll (1932) and Fisher (1984) share the view that narrative works like an argument even though the former is treating narrative at the maneuver level and the latter considers it at the grand-strategy level. Brandt (1979, p. 77) sees both that narration is a "different order of discourse" from argumentation and that a rhetor "argues" points by narration. It does so, ostensibly, by identifying audiences with narrative-generated point of view, thereby providing what has been often called a psychological presumption.

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